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Abstract
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Request for Comments on the extent to which small businesses
may be harmed by litigation tactics by corporations‟ attempts to enforce trademark rights beyond a
reasonable interpretation of the scope of the rights granted to the trademark owner; the best use of
Government services to protect trademarks and prevent counterfeiting; and appropriate policy
recommendations.
The PTO should be commended for considering whether the use of trademark litigation as a form of
“bullying” is a problem for the U.S. trademark system. While some consider trademark litigation as a
justifiable effort to police marks to avoid acquiescence to infringing uses, our comprehensive study supports
another explanation. We have observed that trademark litigation is increasingly used as a bullying tactic, rather
than an effort to reduce serious infringing activity. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines bullying
as treating others “abusively” or “to affect by means of force or coercion.”
I urge you to consider the suggestions made herein, including adoption of a “Fame Registry” by the PTO,
creation of a federal cause of action for bullying under the Sherman Act, and finally, the recommendation that
Congress amend the FTDA to make the test for dilution “actual dilution,” rather than a “likelihood of
dilution,” wherein plaintiffs would not be encouraged to obtain fame at any cost.
Keywords
trademarks, trademark law, PTO, patent and trademark office, intellectual property
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Intellectual Property Law
This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/203
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February 18, 2011 
The Honorable David J. Kappos  
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and  
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450  
Re: Response to Request for Comments on Study and Report provisions of section 
4 of the Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 66 (2010).  
 
Dear Under Secretary Kappos:  
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Request for Comments on the 
extent to which small businesses may be harmed by litigation tactics by 
corporations‟ attempts to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable 
interpretation of the scope of the rights granted to the trademark owner; the best 
use of Government services to protect trademarks and prevent counterfeiting; and 
appropriate policy recommendations.   
I am a Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property Institute at 
the William Mitchell College of Law.  Under my direction, the Institute recently 
completed a comprehensive study of nearly 7,500 reported trademark litigation 
decisions between 1947 and 2005, and published our findings in Trademark 
Extortion: The End of Trademark Law,
1
  which is attached for reference.  The 
data is maintained and annually updated at http://www.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-
property/?page=321&Mitchell+Study+on+Trademark+Litigation.   
I.  INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL REMARKS 
The PTO should be commended for considering whether the use of trademark 
litigation as a form of “bullying” is a problem for the U.S. trademark system.  
While some consider trademark litigation as a justifiable effort to police marks to 
avoid acquiescence to infringing uses,
2
 our comprehensive study supports another 
explanation.  We have observed that trademark litigation is increasingly used as a 
                                                                                                                                     
1
 Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. 
REV. 585 (2008). 
2
 See Wallpaper Mfrs. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 759–61, 766 (C.C.P.A. 
1982) (noting that when trademark holders fail to sue infringers, they risk losing the significance 
of their mark).  
[2:13 2011] Open Letter to Director David Kappos of the 15 
 United States Patent and Trademark Office 
bullying tactic, rather than an effort to reduce serious infringing activity. 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines bullying as treating others 
“abusively” or “to affect by means of force or coercion.”
3
  
The Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation indicates that trademark holders 
are increasingly filing infringement suits, but also notes a considerable decline in 
cases that are prosecuted to a conclusion on their merits.
4
  In fact, the data shows 
that if prosecuted to a trial on their merits, the trademark holder/plaintiff would 
likely lose.  In the 60 year history of the Lanham Act, plaintiffs have prevailed 
50% of the time.
5
  In the decade of 1980 to 1989, plaintiffs prevailed nearly 54% 
of the time.  This piece of data is not yet public; however, in the decade of 2000 to 
2009, defendants prevailed nearly 54% of the time.
6
  This “strike suit” conduct 
and the fact that plaintiffs prevail less frequently suggests that trademark holders 
are using suits, or the threat of suits, in a predatory fashion to force defendants to 
either acquiesce or to spend money and time defending or settling suits.  
II.  “BULLYING” OR EXTORTION? 
Of course, trademark holders must police their trademarks or suffer the fate of 
a court subsequently finding that they have acquiesced to infringing uses or that 
the mark now lacks distinctiveness.
7





 conduct is detected, it is imperative for the trademark holder to act.
10
  
                                                                                                                                     
3
 MERRIAM-WEBSTER‟S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 163 (11th ed. 2008). 
4
 Port, supra note 1, at 589.  
5
 Id. at 613 graph B.  
6
 See id. graph C.  
7
 Wallpaper Mfrs., 680 F.2d at 766. 
8
 Infringement is present when there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks.  See, 
e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 112, 120 (2004) 
(noting that prima facie claims for trademark infringement require the element of likelihood of 
consumer confusion).  The traditional formulation of trademark infringement required there to be 
competition between the parties, that is, “commerce that could be regulated by Congress.”  See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  This provision has long been thought to be the constitutional 
justification of trademarks after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Patent and Copyright 
Clause, id. cl. 8, could not be used to justify federal protection of trademarks.  In re Trademark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95–97 (1879).  Recently, there seems to be some “mission shift” as some 
courts are not requiring there to be competition before finding a likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[C]onfusion . . . may 
exist in the absence of direct competition.”).  Originally and constitutionally, without competition 
there could be no likelihood of confusion and therefore no infringement.  That is, “one merchant 
shall not divert customers from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the 
second.”  See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).  Under the Lanham 
Act, trademark infringement is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006), but this provision neither 
mentions “likelihood of confusion” nor defines it in any way. 
9
 Trademark dilution occurs when the use of a trademark by another “lessen[s] the capacity of 
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of [competition or 
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The trademark holder is under no obligation to send cease and desist letters to all 
infringers, nor sue every infringer.  The trademark holder need only use 
reasonable efforts to police their trademarks.
11
  However, if long periods of 
infringing use are not objected to, the trademark holder may experience difficulty 
in subsequently enforcing that mark.
12
  Therefore, under the incentive to protect 




The normal course of conduct followed in protecting trademark rights is 
logical and facially legitimate.  The process starts when the trademark holder 
sends a cease and desist letter to an offending user of a mark and objects to that 
usage.
14
  If ignored, or if the other party responds that it will not cease use, an 
infringement or dilution law suit may result.  This is the normal, rational course of 
conduct in trademark litigation. 
However, I respectively submit that some trademark holders are not being 
reasonable in their assertions of infringement and are merely doing so to make 
their marks famous so that they can exploit the dilution provisions of the Lanham 
Act. 
                                                                                                                                     
likelihood of confusion].”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 
U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
10
 This article concentrates on Article III court proceedings.  However, a similar argument can 
be made about trademark oppositions and cancellations before the PTO, an administrative body.   
For example, there were over 6,500 oppositions filed in calendar year 2006.  Jon W. Dudas, 
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006, 2006 USPTO ANN. REP. 145 tbl.23, 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2006/2006annualreport.pdf.  However, over 95% of these 
will result in settlement or dismissal prior to a final disposition.  Roberta S. Bren, Opposition 
Proceedings Before the Patent & Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board, 183, 185 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study, Apr. 23, 1998), WL SC68 ALI-ABA 183; see also Roberta S. Bren, 
Opposition Proceedings Before the Patent & Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board Exhibits, 375 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Apr. 23, 1998), WL SC68 ALI-ABA 375. 
11
Accurate Merch. Inc. v. American Pac., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 200 (1975) (“This statute 
places an affirmative duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark, such as TELE-TENDER to 
take reasonable measures to detect and prevent misleading uses of his trademark by his licensees 
or suffer cancellation of his federal registration.  15 U.S.C. §U 1064 (2006) provides that a 
trademark registration may be cancelled because the trademark has been “abandoned”).  
12
 Wallpaper Mfrs., 680 F.2d at 763. 
13
 Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2000). 
14
 See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Ty polices the use 
of „Beanie(s)‟ vigorously by filing lawsuits, sending cease and desist letters, and opposing 
trademark applications for the word or its cognates”). 
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III.  SEEKING A BROADENING OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS  
(E.G., ONCE “FAMOUS,” AND ELIGIBLE FOR DILUTION  
PROTECTION, COMPETITION NO LONGER IS RELEVANT) 
Some trademark holders use this legitimate course of conduct beyond its 
intended purpose to object to truly objectionable uses.  The growing trend shows 
that the normal course of conduct is being used to expand their trademark rights.  
A compelling indication of this theory: trademark holders send thousands of cease 
and desist letters to a degree that “sample” cease and desist letters are readily 
available on the Internet.
15
  
This rampant increase in cease and desist correspondence has been followed 
by hundreds of trademark infringement filings.
16
  These cases are not necessarily 
prosecuted to a conclusion on their merits.  In fact, if prosecuted to a trial on their 
merits, the trademark holder/plaintiff would likely lose because the underlying 
claims are often unmeritorious.
17
  Reliance on unwarranted claims in litigation is 
referred to as a “strike suit.”
18
  These are law suits which, in the trademark 
context involving cease and desist letters, have a different objective than merely 
stopping the use or conduct of the would-be defendant (hereinafter “strike suit 
conduct”).  Their objective is to raise market entrance or continuation costs to the 
competitor. 
Only 1.3% of federal trademark cases reached a trial on the merits last year.
19
  
Although much is said about litigious Americans,
20 
the ratio of trademark cases 
that reach a trial on the merits continues to decline,
21
 but the total number of cases 
filed continues to go up.
22
  While there may be several causes for the shrinking 
percentage of cases that make it to a trial on the merits (such as money, time, 
                                                                                                                                     
15
 See, e.g., Charles Runyan, Sample Cease & Desist Letter to Sent to a Domain Name Owner 
Whose Domain Name is Infringing on a Trademark, KEYTLAW – A LEGAL INFORMATION 
RESOURCE, http://www.keytlaw.com/urls/c&d.htm  (last modified Oct. 21, 2008).  
16
 Microsoft filed 235 trademark infringement law suits from the years 2001 to 2005. Michael 
Barbaro & Julie Creswell, With Trademark in Its Pocket, Levi’s Turns to Suing Its Rivals, N.Y. 
TIMES, January 29, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/business/29jeans.html. 
17
 Even when not an apparent strike suit because the plaintiff does seek to litigate the case to a 
final decision on the merits, the trademark holder only prevails about half of the time.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 5–6. 
18
 See Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1091 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A strike suit is 
defined as „[a] suit . . . often based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as 
leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.‟” (quoting BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY1448 
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999))). 
19
 Port, supra note 1, at 619 graph N. 
20
 See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U.L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 
(2004) (citing sources commenting commentary on the frequency of American litigation).  
21
 See Port, supra note 19, at 619 graph N.  
22
 See id., at 618 graph L.  
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etc.), one cause of this small percentage seems to be the prevalence of strike suit 
conduct. 
 This strike suit conduct is also prevalent at the registration stage.  In this 
case, a trademark holder objects to the registration of a mark.  The objection is 
based on the idea that the trademark holder has to plow a wide path through 
commerce in the United States.  The wider this path is, the better it is for the 
existing trademark holder. It is better in a sense that, as more third parties 
acquiesce to its use, the stronger the mark becomes. 
As the trademark holder plows this wide swath through American commerce, 
through strike suit conduct in litigation before Article III courts, cease and desist 
letters, or objecting to the registration of marks,
23 
the trademark holder‟s mark 
becomes that much more distinctive and strong.
24
 
With this conduct, gradually but assuredly, the actual scope of protection of 
the trademark broadens.  As the trademark scope broadens, the mark becomes 
more distinctive.  As it becomes more distinctive, the more likely it is that a 
skilled litigant can successfully argue that it has become famous.  Once famous, it 
becomes subject to protection from dilution.
25
  Once a mark is protected from 
dilution, it has reached the zenith of its power to exclude others, regardless of 
whether the goods on or in connection with which the marks are used are in 
competition.  That is, once the mark becomes famous and eligible for dilution 
protection, competition is no longer relevant.
26
 
                                                                                                                                     
23
 This is the practice of filing petitions to cancel registered marks or to oppose the 
registration of trademark applications.  These proceedings are not Article III style court 
proceedings but rather administrative proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(T.T.A.B. 2004).  See T.T.A.B. Manual of Procedure, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ttab/tbmp/index.html. 
24
 Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
25
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (“For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is 
widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source 
of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the 
requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the 
following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, 
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.  (ii) The amount, volume, and 
geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark.  (iii) The extent of actual 
recognition of the mark.  (iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or 
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register”). 
26
 See 15 U.S.C. 1125 § 2(b)–(c)(2006) (“„[D]ilution by blurring” is an association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The 
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IV.  EFFECTS OF TRADEMARK EXTORTION 
This strike suit conduct, whether employed at the cease and desist stage, 
litigation stage, or registration stage, is a form of trademark extortion, and it has 
the following effects:  
1)  The scope of the trademark increases through this extortion rather than 
increased use; 
2)  Competition is made more expensive and therefore there is less of it as 
parties avoid conflict with an existing market player;  
3)  Once the scope of the trademark becomes wide enough, the holder of the 
trademark can call its mark “famous” and take advantage of all that the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act has to offer;  
4) Parties use trademark extortion as a tactic for reasons beyond mere victory 
in court.  As a result, trademark rights are not based on use, as the 
Constitution and the Lanham Act demand, but, instead, based on 
trademark extortion;  
5)  The purpose of the FTDA was to protect famous marks from dilutive 
conduct, yet to the extent trademark holders are creating their fame 
through trademark extortion rather than through use, the FTDA is not 
served.  Ironically, the FTDA actually encourages trademark extortion 
because it places such a premium on making a mark famous.  Therefore, 
to make its mark famous, trademark holders will employ any strategy 
necessary, including trademark extortion.   
 The attached article fully documents these assertions.
27
 
Our data further suggests that large trademark holders often have no need to 
file suit to extort settlements from small businesses. Bullies rely on threats to sue, 
and also create notorious reputations to give market entrants the impression that 
they will be sued for trademark infringement, among other things. Use of these 
intimidation tactics against market entrants is often enough to raise competitor 
costs and deter market entry.
28
   
                                                                                                                                     
degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.  (ii) The degree of 
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.  (iii) The extent to which the owner of the 
famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.  (iv) The degree of 
recognition of the famous mark.  (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create 
an association with the famous mark.  (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name 
and the famous mark [and] „dilution by tarnishment‟ is association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark”). 
27
 Port, supra note 1, at 591.  
28
 See id. at 603–05; see also id., at 604 nn.102–03.  
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V.  CORRELATION BETWEEN DROP IN CASE FILINGS AND BULLYING 
Trademark litigation has fallen precipitously since the 2001 recession.
29
  
Damage awards, attorney fee awards, the number of reported claims, and 
dispositive decisions continue to decrease while the number of cases initially filed 
continues to increase.
30
  These filings appear to be directly related to a desire to 
cause the alleged infringer to acquiesce to the demands of the trademark holder 
because of actual or threatened trademark litigation.  We know that these holders 
do not actually litigate cases to a conclusion because all trademark litigation 
indicators are in a precipitous free fall.  Only initial filings are increasing, 
indicating these companies are filing suit, but are not following through with the 
litigation.  This phenomenon may lead to trademark rights being based on a law 
suit or threat of a law suit, not based on use.   
VI.  DOES SIZE CONFER AN ADVANTAGE IN TRADEMARK LITIGATION? 
Our study included all reported cases (7,414) that relied on the Lanham Act 
from July, 1946 to December, 2005.
31
  After removing all non-substantive 
trademark cases and those decided on procedural grounds, we were left with 
2,659 cases, each of which dispositively and terminally adjudicated a trademark 
claim.
32
  We observed in eighty-six cases at least one of the parties was listed on 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).  Of these, the company on the Dow 
prevailed nearly 75% of the time. “Compared to all cases, the trademark claimant 
only prevailed about 50% of the time.”
33
  The track record of parties ever listed on 
the Dow at the time of the litigation is as follows: 
Company  Wins  Losses 
3M  2 0 
American Express  1 1 
AT&T  2 1 
Caterpillar  1 1 
Chrysler  1 0 
Eastman Kodak  2 0 
Exxon  4 3 
General Electric Co.  3 0 
                                                                                                                                     
29




 The Institute database is in process of being updated, and case data through 2008 will be 
added to our results in mid-2011. The results can be accessed through our website: 
www.cybaris.com.  
32
 Port, supra note 1, at 623.  
33
 Id. at 630.  
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General Foods  2 1 
General Motors Corp  8 1 
Goodyear  2 2 
Hewlett-Packard  1 1 
Honeywell  1 0 
IBM  2 0 
J.P. Morgan  1 0 
McDonalds  5 2 
Microsoft  7 2 
Pfizer 1 0 
Philip Morris  2 0 
Procter & Gamble  4 1 
Sears Roebuck & Co.  5 3 
Texaco  1 0 
Union Carbide  2 1 
Wal-Mart  1 0 
Walt Disney  2 1 
Westinghouse Electric  1 1 
 
This data supports the conclusion that companies listed on the DJIA have a 
significantly higher chance of succeeding on the merits than if the company is not 
listed.  
Data for all litigants, regardless of size, shows that through 2005, trademark 
holders had a slightly better than 50% chance of succeeding on the merits in cases 
which proceeded to litigation.
34
  They have a 55% chance of obtaining an 
injunction, if demanded.
35
  They have a 5.5% chance of receiving any damages at 
all.
36
  The claimant succeeds on the merits only about half the time.
37
  
VII.  BULLYING EXAMPLE: KOI RESTAURANT, LOS ANGELES, CA 
In Sikder Holdings, Inc. v. Koi Asian Bistro, Inc.,
38
 the plaintiff alleged that 
five of its registered trademarks (Reg. Nos. 2,950,303; 2,946,808; 2,961,393; 
2,970473; 78,455,283) amounted to an exclusive right to use the word “koi” on or 
                                                                                                                                     
34








 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 28, Sikder Holdings, Inc. v. Koi Asian Bistro, Inc., 
No. 4:06-CV-186, 2006 WL 2579515 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2006) (asserting that the defendant‟s 
unauthorized continued use of Koi marks absent authorization constitutes infringement of the 
plaintiff‟s exclusive rights to the registered marks).  
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in connection with Japanese-style restaurants.  The plaintiff claimed that the word 
“koi” was famous and arbitrary as it had no meaning in any language.  Although 
the Examiner was convinced and withdrew the 2(d) refusal based on this logic, 
the word “koi,” actually is a ubiquitous term in the Japanese restaurant business.  
It means “carp.”
39
  It has broad appeal in the Japanese society.  A carp, or “koi,” 
is often served at festive occasions.   
For one entity to claim that it could obtain exclusive rights to the word “koi” 
for use in Japanese-style restaurants is completely inconsistent with the reality of 
the word as it is actually used.  Upon information and belief, the plaintiff in this 
cause of action is a well-known restaurant in the Los Angeles area.  It was 
attempting to become famous nationwide.  To do so, it believed it was necessary 
to stomp out all other uses of this ubiquitous term in Japanese restaurants and 
even mislead the Trademark Office with statements in the file wrapper that the 
word “koi” meant nothing in any foreign language. 
This is a perfect, specific example of bullying.  I refer to it as extortion.  The 
defendant in this case was saved merely by the fact that its insurance carrier was 
made to defend against this law suit.
40
  But for that insurance coverage, Koi Asian 
Bistro, a small restaurant in North Carolina, would have been forced to change 
their name. 
VIII.  THE U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE ROLE IN DISCOURAGEMENT AND 
PREVENTION OF TRADEMARK BULLYING 
Since, as indicated above, the real cause of trademark bullying is the drive to 
make marks famous, the PTO could effectively and substantially alleviate this 
issue by adopting a “Fame Registry.”  Only marks on this registry would be 
permitted to use section 43(c) in an offensive manner.  Trademark registrants 
would apply to the Fame Registry
41
 and the PTO would determine whether or not 
a mark was truly and normatively famous.  This would prevent creative lawyers 
from arguing that a mark had become famous through bullying behavior rather 
than from use. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
39
 MERRIAM-WEBSTER‟S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 692 (“[A] carp bred 
especially in Japan for large size and a variety of colors and often stocked in ornamental ponds”).  
40
 See generally Koi Asian Bistro, 2007 WL 4885065, at *1 (E.D.N.C. dismissed Nov. 27, 
2007) (indicating that the plaintiff, Sikder Holdings, stipulated to a voluntary dismissal pursuant to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) only after Koi Asian Bistro maintained its defense for over 15 months 
of litigation).  
41
 Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registration System for Famous Trademarks, 93 Trademark 
Rep. 1097, 1100–02 (2003); Kenneth L. Port, The Trademark Super Register: A Response to 
Professor Smith, 94 Trademark Rep. 881, 882 (2004).  
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IX.  THE U.S. COURTS ROLE IN DISCOURAGING TRADEMARK BULLIES 
In fact, U.S. courts have a responsibility to curb trademark bullying and they 
are doing so.  The data indicates that, even as the number of initial infringement 
claims increases, the percentage of cases that reach a trial on the merits continues 
to go down.  Even though this is the real setting, the number of cases where the 
plaintiff prevails is dropping drastically.  This appears to be a clear example of 
how courts are handling trademark bullying.  Plaintiffs simply prevail less 
frequently. 
However, courts could be even more aggressive in combating trademark 
bullying.  One possibility would be to make trademark bullying an illegal restraint 
of trade under the Sherman Act. 
X.  CONGRESS‟ ROLE IN DISCOURAGING OR  
PREVENTING TRADEMARK BULLYING 
Congress has the largest responsibility to eliminate trademark bullying; 
however, Congressional action in the last decade has only encouraged it.  As 
indicated above, trademark owners deem “fame” to be the ultimate objective of 
their trademark.  Some trademark owners are willing to invest serious resources to 
obtain a “famous” designation.  Once famous, the scope of protection a trademark 
receives under the dilution theory expands exponentially.   
If, for example, Congress merely made the test for dilution “actual dilution” 
instead of a “likelihood of dilution,” plaintiffs would not be encouraged to obtain 
fame at any cost.  Plaintiffs would use the dilution statute as it was originally 
intended: a gap filling provision to be used only when other trademark remedies 
failed and when a trademark owner was exposed to real harm in the marketplace.  
As is, trademark holders are encouraged to make their marks famous to deny 
market access to competitors and non-competitors alike. 
In addition, Congress (and/or State legislatures) could mandate that insurance 
carriers defend against trademark infringement.  This would provide great value 
to level the playing field between aggressive trademark plaintiffs and smaller 
entity trademark defendants.  Some courts have determined that trademark 
infringement is an “advertising injury.”
42
  However, in such States, insurance 
companies have quickly re-written insurance policies to exempt trademark 
infringement from coverage.  Presently, it seems that the only way to see smaller 
entity trademark users play on a balanced field is to somehow require that 
insurance companies cover trademark infringement as an advertising injury. 
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XI.  CONCLUSION 
I commend the PTO for its solicitation of comments on whether trademark 
litigation is being used as bullying and is harmful to small employers.  I think the 
problem is larger than mere bullying and amounts to trademark extortion.  This 
extortion is manifest as strike suit conduct designed to raise the cost of market 
entrance or continuation costs of competitors. I also believe that size of litigants 
does matter.  Dow Jones listed companies prevailed nearly 75% of the time in 
trademark cases, compared to 50% for all cases.  In addition, this strike suit 
conduct has the effect of making already well known marks even more 
prominence, giving rise to holders claims that their marks are now “famous” and 
subject to Federal Trademark Dilution Act protection.  
Illustrating the problem for small employers was “Koi Restaurant” in Los 
Angeles.  If the defendant had not secured insurance coverage to defend itself in a 
non-meritorious claim, it would have been forced to give up its name, merely 
because it lacked the resources to defend itself.  
I urge you to consider the suggestions made herein, including adoption of a 
“Fame Registry” by the PTO, creation of a federal cause of action for bullying 
under the Sherman Act, and finally, the recommendation that Congress amend the 
FTDA to make the test for dilution “actual dilution,” rather than a “likelihood of 
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